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Juries-New Trial-Discovery of Juror's
Disqualification or False Answer on Voir Dire as
Ground For New Trial*
The United States Constitution recognizes the requirement that
a jury be impartial in its deliberation.' Legislation and courtroom
procedure attempt to guarantee that impartiality. Foir dire examinations under the direction and authority of the court are calculated
to insure that each juror selected shall be qualified to serve on the
jury panel. When a prospective juror is disqualified or shown to be
biased, a challenge for cause is allowed. Also, if counsel suspects
from the disclosures that a juror is prejudiced or unfit, he may challenge peremptorily. In this way most questionable jurors are
avoided.
Generally, it is not a ground for new trial that a juror is discovered
to be disqualified or incompetent unless the moving party shows
prejudice which prevented him from having a fair and impartial
trial.2 In contrast, however, a juror's false answer or concealment on
matters that would establish his disqualification or incompetency and
would have prompted the party complaining to challenge for cause or
peremptorily, is a ground for new trial.3
In the recent New Mexico case of State v. Ortega,4 the defendants
were convicted of aggravated battery. After the verdict was re* State v. Ortega, 422 P.2d 353 (N.M. 1966).
1. The sixth amendment explicitly guarantees an impartial jury trial in criminal
cases; the same is implicit in the seventh amendment for most civil cases. The federal
constitutional right does not apply to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Nevertheless, the
right is preserved in state constitutions. See e.g., N.M. Const. art. 2, § 12.
There are sound reasons for impartiality in jury trials:
The principle exacting and requiring disinterestedness, fairness, and impartiality on the part of the jury is as old as the history of the jury system. ...
It is fundamental, and it is popular knowledge that the inviolability of this
principle gives credit, or even toleration, to the verdicts of juries. Caesar
demanded that his wife should not only be virtuous, but beyond suspicion, and
the law's demand for disinterested jurors whose verdicts affect the property,
the honor, and the life of the citizen is no less exacting.
Hess' Adm'r v. Louisville & N. Ry., 249 Ky. 624, 61 S.W.2d 299, 301 (1933).
2. Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1120 (1963), and cases cited therein. The rule applies only
in cases involving a returned verdict and does not govern when a challenge for cause
on voir dire has been overruled by the court.
3. See e.g., Sipley v. Permanente Hospitals, 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 274 P.2d 53 (1st.
Dist. 1954) ; Kerby v. Hiesterman, 162 Kan. 490, 178 P.2d 194 (1947) ; McHugh v.
Jones, 258 App. Div. 11, 16 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
4. 422 P.2d 353 (N.M. 1966).
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turned, counsel for the defendants discovered that one of the jurors
had been convicted of a felony. In a motion for new trial the defendants contended that because of this conviction the juror was disqualified by statute and had misled the defendants when he stated on
the voir dire that he knew of no reason why he should not serve on the
jury. After hearing arguments, the trial court entered an order denying the motion, finding that the defendants had not been injured by
the juror's presence on the panel. On appeal to the New Mexico
Supreme Court, held, Affirmed.
The defendants urged the court to adopt the rule that presence of
an unqualified juror raises a presumption of actual injury to the moving party." The court declined to adopt the rule saying that by
statute,0 "actual injury" must be shown by the moving party before
a new trial will be ordered. The court implicitly disposed of the
defendants' second argument that a false answer impairs the right to
challenge with the same language-that since no "actual injury" was
shown, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for new
7
trial.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the practical consequences of the "actual injury" rule and to explore the possible result had the court discussed the defendants' false answer argument.
Most states have statutory provisions describing juror qualifications. They usually prescribe status requirements such as residence,
citizenship, and the power to vote.8 In addition, the courts have re5. Id., at 354.
6. The statutory provisions referred to by the court were N.M. Stat. Ann. § 19-1-1
to -2 (1953). Section 19-1-1 describes qualifications for jury service: that a person be a
citizen, over twenty-one years of age, of sound mind, a resident and not convicted of
bribery or other infamous crime. Section 19-1-2 provides for exceptions from jury
service which a person may voluntarily invoke, and concludes, "The service upon any
jury of any person disqualified or exempt from service shall, of itself, not vitiate any
indictment found or any verdict rendered by that jury, unless actual injury to the
person complaining of the same shall be shown. . . ." (emphasis added).
7. State v. Ortega, 422 P.2d 353 (N.M. 1966). The court may have felt that the
juror's conviction was remote. Also, since the juror was not specifically questioned regarding a possible conviction the court may have reasoned that the juror had not
"concealed" a material fact and therefore the defendents had not suffered an "actual
injury."
8. See e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-201 (1956) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78-1-1
(1963); Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-8 (1953). Although jurisdictions may differ in their
requirements for jury service, a typical classification may include the following
provisions: (1) citizenship and eligibility to vote: (2) residence in the jurisdiction;
(3) ownership of property or payment of taxes; (4) minimum and maximum age
limits; (5) general health; (6) sex; (7) mental competency; (8) character, morality
and criminal record; (9) membership in a specific group or class; and (10) prior jury
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quired that jurors be unbiased and not prejudiced; parties may invoke these general requirements by challenge for cause.9
In most jurisdictions statutory qualifications are directive rather
than mandatory; since the legislature did not intend the provisions to
be construed absolutely, a court, in its discretion, may waive the requirement and empanel the juror. 10 Of course a party may object
and challenge the juror for cause or peremptorily when this occurs.
In those jurisdictions where disqualifications are not mandatory,
such as New Mexico, a party requesting a new trial must show: that
he has been injured or prejudiced by the juror's presence on the
panel and participation in the verdict;" that the injury or prejudice
was material, 12 and that failure to know of the juror's disqualification or prejudice was not due to the party's lack of diligence in examination or inquiry.' 3 In cases where disqualification because of
nonage, lack of citizenship, or non-residence is alleged as a ground
for new trial, it seems that courts are justified in concluding that the
moving party has not been materially prejudiced or injured. 4 However, in cases where more material grounds of possible prejudice or
injury are claimed, courts tend to grant new trials. "
service. Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection,
36 B.U.L. Rev. 1 (1956.
9. See e.g., Hess' Adm'r v. Louisville & N. Ry., 249 Ky. 624, 61 S.W.2d 299 (1933):
Knickerbocker v. Erie R. Co., 286 N.Y.S. 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
10. See e.g., Netter's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. Ry., 134 Ky. 678, 121 S.W. 636
(1909). In Texas, any person who has been convicted of theft or any other felony, is
under indictment or other accusation, is mentally incompetent, or has a defect in sight,
feeling, hearing or disease to make him unfit, is absolutely disqualified from jury service. These disqualifications apply to civil as well as criminal cases. Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann.
§ 2133.4 (1964) ; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. §§ 35.16 (1966). Since the requirements
are mandatory, a new trial will be ordered without a showing of injury or prejudice
to the moving party. Ex Parte Bronson, 158 Tex. Crim. 127, 254 S.W.2d 117 (1952).
11. Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1120 (1963), and cases cited therein.
12. Id.
13. See e.g., Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1949) ; Netter's Adm'r v.
Louisville & N. Ry., 134 Ky. 678, 121 S.W. 636 (1909) ; Territory v. Anderson, 4 N.M.
(4 Gild., E.W.S.ed.) 213, 13 P. 21 (1887).
14. In some cases, the distinction between material injury or prejudice to a party
on a collateral matter would be difficult to determine. One court has mentioned a
peculiar reason for not holding possible prejudice to be material:
I know of no rule which disqualifies a juror because of acquaintance, or even
professional relationship, with a witness for one of the parties. Indeed it might
well be urged that on the contrary such knowledge would assist a juror in appraising the credibility of the witness. (emphasis added).
Kelly v. Gulf Oil Corp., 28 F. Supp. 205, 207 (E.D. Penn. 1938).
15. See e.g., McMahon v. Yonkers R.R., 294 N.Y.S. 945 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (juror
participated in the first trial of the cause) ; Lund v. Dist. Ct., 90 Utah 433, 62 P.2d 278
(1936) (juror concealed the fact that he had been convicted of a felony.
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In State v. Ortega the New Mexico Supreme Court failed to
distinguish these non-prejudicial grounds from more material
grounds such as felony conviction and mental incompetency. Instead,
the court said that "actual injury" must be shown when a statutory
disqualification is claimed." Since "actual injury" must also be
shown when non-statutory grounds are alleged,' 7 the question is
presented in all cases: how can a moving party show "actual injury" ?
The trial court, in its discretion, must necessarily determine what
is "actual injury."' 8 To persuade the court of this, a party must
either produce evidence that the juror was in fact disqualified or unfit
or introduce the jurors' affidavits testifying that the juror in question made prejudicial statements about the party.' 9 Since the latter
method is prohibited in New Mexico, 2 ° a party islimited to arguing
the merits of his allegation before the court.
In Ortega neither the trial judge nor the supreme court was persuaded by counsel's argument that the presence of a convicted person on the jury prejudiced the defendants' possibility of a favorable
verdict. The obvious presumption would be that a juror who had
been convicted of a crime would be sympathetic to the defendants
in a criminal prosecution. Yet, just as easily, the juror could have
been influenced by fears of retaliation and harassment or unconsciously motivated to "bend over backwards" to be fair to the
prosecution.
16. State v. Ortega, 422 P.2d 353, 354 (N.M. 1966).
17. State v. Manzanares, 33 N.M. 573, 272 P. 565 (1928). In that case defendant
was convicted of assault. Although three of the jurors were cousins of the prosecuting
witness, the Supreme Court said that since no "actual injury" was proven regarding
possible prejudice, the trial court's order denying the motion for new trial would be
affirmed.
18. Emphasizing the trial judge's discretion, one court has said:
The refusal or denial of a motion for a new trial for alleged misconduct on
the part of the jury is, as a general rule, a matter within the discretion of the
judge .. . ; and unless it appears that this discretion has been abused, . . .
his refusal to grant a new trial will not be disturbed.
Kerby v. Hiesterman, 162 Kan. 490, 178 P.2d 194, 198 (1947).
19. See e.g., Shipley v. Permanente Hospitals, 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 274 P.2d 53
(1st. Dist. 1954) ; People v. Leonti, 262 N.Y. 256, 186 N.E. 693 (1933).
20. New Mexico has adopted the rule that forbids jurors from impeaching their
verdict by affidavits, whether the misconduct inheres in the verdict or not. Skeet v.
Wilson, 76 N.M. 697, 417 P.2d 889 (1966). Although there is disagreement, the general
rule seems to be that affidavits will be allowed in support of a motion for new trial to
show actual bias disclosed by statements made by the juror. See, Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d
971 (1956), and cases cited therein.
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In an earlier New Mexico case, State v. Eskildson,2 1 the supreme
court was faced with an even more questionable juror. In that case
the defendant was convicted of murder. There was a conflict of testimony regarding what had occured on the night of the killing. In a
motion for new trial, the defendant alleged that one of the jurors
was mentally incompetent and presented affidavits of a psychiatrist
to support the allegation. Yet the supreme court upheld the trial
court's denial of a new trial.
Thus, from Ortega and Eskildson it appears that the court requires an almost impossible showing of injury and will not allow a
new trial where substantial doubt exists as to a juror's competency
and impartiality. The problem is especially acute in complex cases
like Eskildson where one juror's opinion can decide the verdict. Consequently, the court should be liberal in its grant of a motion for new
trial when substantial doubt exists as to a juror's impartiality, and
also take a more lenient stand regarding its requirements for showing of proof.
If the "actual injury" rule is to prevail, parties must make painstaking inquiries and examinations of each juror to insure that he is
not unfit. But should the moving party bear the burden of inquiry
into a juror's possible disqualification or prejudice? Many courts
deny a new trial reasoning that the moving party was not diligent in
discovering the incompetency or prejudice.23 Others, however, do
not seem to place a high premium on diligence. 24 Often expense and
lack of time make it impossible for counsel and his aides to thoroughly investigate each potential juror and also prepare an effective
case.
In addition to the party's burden of diligence in examination on
voir dire and discovery of disqualification through investigation, the
trial judge has a duty to examine generally on the voir dire25 and
21. 36 N.M. 238, 13 P.2d 417 (1932).
22. Id. at 245, 13 P.2d at 421.
23. See e.g., Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1949) ; Harris v. People, 113
pColo. 511, 160 P.2d 372 (1945): Territory v. Anderson, 4 N.M. (4 Gild., E.W.S.ed.)
213, 13 P. 21 (1887).
24. In Bishop v. Nicholson, 146 S.C. 245, 143 S.E. 802 (1928), the court asked any
jurors employed by the defendant to stand up. All who stood were excused except for
one who remained on the panel. A new trial was granted on the ground that counsel
for the plaintiff did not know of the juror's disqualification. This decision is the extreme
example of a court's mitigation of the rule requiring diligence by the moving party.
See also note 38 infra.
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 19-1-35 (1953) requires the trial judge to examine prospective jurors for cause.
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the state has the duty of preparing a list of qualified jurors. 26 The
juror also has a duty to disclose information that may disqualify
him. Those who fail to disclose or give false answers on the voir
dire could be subjected to sanctions for contempt of court or perjury.
One alternative to requiring a heavy burden of inquiry on the
moving party is to shift some of the burden to the state. But as a
survey made in 194228 concluded, few states effectively accept the
task:
'It

is apparent

. . .

that, while ostensibly an investigation

is

made in most states as to the competency of the prospective juror, in
only a few has there been any attempt to do this in a scientific or

businesslike fashion. For the most part reliance on personal information or inquiry of others is the basis of the determination, and such
traditional methods can hardly be considered efficient in these days of
29
increasing congestion and mobility of population.'

Easing the party's burden of inquiry could also be accomplished
by requiring the trial judge to examine jurors more fully and caution
them about concealment or false reply on the voir dire; enforcement
of contempt and perjury sanctions against jurors who disregard the
court's admonitions would also aid the parties.
Sound policy reasons may exist for limiting the right to a new trial
26. In New Mexico, jury commissioners prepare a list of jurors from the voting
rolls of the county, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 19-1-11 (1953). That provision says in part,
• . . and said commission shall not knowingly place upon the list selected by
them, the name of any person who is not believed . . . to be qualified and
liable for jury service, or any person whom they have reason to believe has
any interest . . . in any . . . cause of action, criminal or civil, . . . nor shall
they select any person through favor or partiality, or for any other reason
except to provide a list of suitable persons for jury duty ...
Thus it appears that the state has an affirmative duty to provide qualified jurors;
wouldn't counsel be justified in relying on the performance of that duty? Requiring that
a commission shall not "knowingly" select an unqualified juror would probably diminish
the reliance.
27. See e.g., Kerby v. Hiesterman, 162 Kan. 490 (178 P.2d 194 (1947).
28. The Knox report to the 1942 Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,
quoted in Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection, 36 B.U.L. Rev. 1 (1956). The report's observations regarding a need for scientific
and businesslike procedures of selection would be even more apparent today. California
probably has the most extensive system of selecting jurors. Investigations, personal
interviews, written examinations, questionaires and intelligence tests are required. Id.
at 70.
29. Id. at 71.
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after a verdict has been returned: clogging of the court's docket may
increase; in some cases a new trial would be financially prohibitive to
one or more parties ;80 in criminal and some civil cases the same
verdict, supported by the weight of the evidence, would be reached
on new trial; 8 ' also, a party may risk a favorable verdict despite
knowledge of the disqualification or prejudice and if he does not pre2
vail, move for a new trial.3
Despite these possible reasons for limited new trial, a party should
be given some chance of proving actual injury. This could be accomplished by: ( 1) shifting more of the burden of inquiry and investigation of jurors to the state; (2) allowing the introduction of jurors'
affidavits in some cases;8 8 (3) granting a new trial if there is substantial doubt as to a juror's impartiality; and (4) recognizing a
presumption of injury in cases where there is a material disqualification or prejudice.
The court in Ortega did not specifically discuss the defendants'
second argument : when the juror stated he knew no reason why
he should not serve, the statement, being false, prevented the defendants from challenging the juror which consequently prevented
a fair trial. One can assume that the court dismissed this argument
by applying the "actual injury" rule.8
When a juror denies or conceals facts which are disqualifications
or grounds of challenge for cause and thereby avoids challenge, a
new trial is ordinarily granted. 6 The same is true in cases where the
30. In his account of the Reynolds v. Pegler libel trial, Louis Nizer observes that a
prejudicial or disqualified juror can ruin a well prepared case and also prompt a long
and expensive new trial. Nizer, My Life in Court, 75, Pyramid Books Ed. (1966).
31. In Territory v. Emilio, 14 N.M. 147, 89 P.239 (1907), the court noted that a new
trial is given for the protection of the innocent, not to shield the guilty, especially
where the record shows the absolute guilt of the defendant.
32. This reason has been recognized by the New Mexico Supreme Court:
The rule proceeds upon the ground that a party ought not to be permitted,
after discovering an act of misconduct which would enable him to claim a
mistrial, to remain silent and take his chances of a favorable verdict, and
afterwards, if the verdict is against him, bring it forward as a ground for
new trial.
Miller v. Marsh, 53 N.M. 5, 10, 201 P.2d 341, 344 (1948).
33. Perhaps this could be accomplished by adopting the general rule in note 20
supra.
34. State v. Ortega, 422 P.2d 353 at 354 (N.M. 1966).
35. Id.
36. See e.g., Kerby v. Hiesterman, 162 Kan. 490, 178 P.2d 194 (1947) ; People v.
Leonti, 262 N.Y. 256, 186 N.E. 693 (1933) ; Lund v. Dist. Ct., 90 Utah 433, 62 P.2d 278
(1936).
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juror would not be subject to disqualification or challenge for cause

but may be challenged peremptorily.8 7 In some cases a new trial is
granted even though a party or counsel had access to information
that could disqualify the juror or subject him to challenge for
cause.88 The fundamental reason for granting a new trial in these
cases is that the moving party, through no fault of his own, has been
misled by the juror and denied the right to challenge either for cause
or peremptorily.89 In other cases involving concealment of a disqualification, not in its nature prejudicial, a new trial is not granted
because, it is said, the losing party has shown no injury. 4
The better reasoned rule is that a party moving for new trial
need not show injury or prejudice for the motion to be granted. 41 In
a Kansas case,4 2 the defendant moved for new trial alleging that
the foreman of the jury had given a false answer when questioned
about business dealings with the plaintiff's counsel. In reversing and
remanding for new trial, the Kansas court held that bias or prejudice did not have to be shown, reasoning that the question is not
whether an improperly constituted tribunal acted fairly but whether
a proper tribunal was established.48
Some courts," in granting the motion for new trial, require the
moving party to show that the false answer or concealment was
made intentionally by the juror. But if the answers to questions on
37. See e.g., Shipley v. Permanente Hospitals, 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 274 P.2d 53
(1st. Dist. 1954) (jurors sympathetic to doctors) ; McHugh v. Jones, 258 App. Div. 11,
16 N.Y.S. 2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (juror knew one of the parties) ; Alexson v. Pierce
County, 186 Wash. 88, 57 P.2d 318 (1936) (juror who had knowledge of property in
question was disqualified because she concealed this fact on the voir dire even though
she did not remember the property until the jury viewed it).
38. See e.g., Piehler v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. 357 Mo. 866, 211 S.W.2d 459
(1948) (juror had a previous claim against the defendant and defendant had a record
of the claim) ; Texas Employer's Ins. Assoc. v. Wade, 197 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946) (plaintiff insurance company had a record of a juror's previous claim against
the company).
39. See e.g., Kerby v. Hiesterman, 162 Kan. 490, 178 P.2d 194 (1947).
40. See e.g., Herrin v. State, 271 S.W. 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925) (juror said
he was a householder); and this has been extended to cases where there is implied
bias, Liberty Cab Co. v. Green, 262 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (in a workmen's
compensation suit, juror failed to reveal that he had received workmen's compensation
payments).
41. See notes 36 and 37 supra and accompanying text.
42. Kerby v. Hiesterman, 162 Kan. 490, 178 P.2d 194 (1947). For a good statement
of reasons for the rule see, Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969, 984 (1933).
43. Kerby v. Hiesterman, 162 Kan. 490, 178 P.2d 194, 199 (1947).
44. See e.g., Springdale Park v. Andriotis, 30 N.J. Super. 257, 104 A.2d 327 (1954)
Kelley v. Parks, 275 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
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voir dire are in fact false or there is a concealment, good faith and
honesty of the juror in making them are no less effective than deliberate perjury in avoiding a peremptory challenge. Thus, the
juror's mental attitude should not be made material to a right of
new trial.45 One court has said,
The deprivation of this inalienable part [no prejudiced jurors]
the right to trial by jury without fault of the party prejudiced
independent from the intent of the juror to conceal and the means
show such deprivation should therefore not 46differ depending
whether the concealment was intentional or not.

of
is
to
on

In the recent New Mexico case of State v. Shawan,4 7 the supreme
court hinted that it might recognize this view. In Shawan the defendant moved for a change of venue alleging that he had been
prejudiced by certain jurors who had read newspaper accounts of
the incident. The supreme court reversed the lower court's denial of
the motion and said, "To expect a juror to confess prejudice is not
always a reliable practice. A juror can be completely honest in deny48
ing prejudice."
In a case where the issue of false answer or concealment is fully
discussed, it seems that supreme court will be forced into the anomalous position of requiring, contrary to the better rule, a showing of
''actual injury" and yet not requiring that the denial or concealment
be intentionally made. It also seems that the court's failure to distinguish between material and non-material grounds for a new trial
will necessitate the same showing for any disqualification or prejudice the moving party may allege. The practical effect of the
court's decisions is to place an almost impossible burden of proof
and persuasion on the moving party to show "actual injury" whether
a disqualification or false answer be in issue.
To avoid the consequences of the "actual injury" rule, practitioners must insure that every juror on the panel is free from defect
and will not prejudice his case. The legislature could reduce the
45. The cases recognize this, e.g., Shipley v. Permanente Hospitals, 127 Cal. App.
2d 417, 274 P.2d 53 (1st. Dist. 1954); Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969
(1933).
46. Shipley v. Perinanente Hospitals, 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 274 P.2d 53, 57 (Ist.
Dist. 1954).
47. 423 P.2d 39 (N.M. 1967).
48. Id., at 42.
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problem by distinguishing between material and non-material disqualifications and by abolishing the "actual injury" rule except for
immaterial disqualifications. If the rule is to prevail, the legislature
should require a more systematic and scientific screening of potential
jurors. In addition the supreme court could abrogate the present
rule of showing of proof and substitute a presumption of injury
when material grounds are alleged and where substantial doubt is
evident from the allegation.
WILLIAM
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